supply-chaintrade-pressNewsThe Broadside1 min read

ScreenConnect RMM+ add-on lets attackers install rogue clients on 288 endpoints

The weak link was integration glue left behind after projects, with privileges that outlived anyone’s memory of approving them.


TL;DR

Huntress told CyberScoop an intruder used cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to install attacker-controlled clients on at least 288 computers across 48 organizations, with roughly a third reached in 10 minutes. ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions across about 400 partner environments and said it found no evidence its infrastructure or ScreenConnect itself was compromised. The practitioner work is dull and urgent: inventory RMM+ and other ScreenConnect extensions, because yesterday’s project add-on became today’s attack path.

CyberScoop is careful about the attribution here, so we should be too: Huntress says an intruder used access to multiple cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to push commands to managed endpoints, and ConnectWise says it has not found evidence of a compromise of its own infrastructure or ScreenConnect itself. That distinction matters. It doesn’t make the incident small. Huntress counted at least 288 computers at 48 organizations receiving attacker-controlled ScreenConnect clients, with all affected machines reached in about 90 minutes.

The apparent weak point, according to Huntress, was RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension built to let other tools manage sessions outside the normal console. Huntress said versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 used a shared access key that defaulted to blank, so an empty value could pass when no key had been configured. Huntress said the extension bypasses the platform’s user and multifactor authentication checks by authenticating through that shared key. ConnectWise responded by disabling five independently developed extensions across roughly 400 partner environments where it could act.

The ugly operational detail is what Huntress says SCKit did after it landed. The malware installed rogue ScreenConnect clients and stopped the legitimate client, then reused the real client’s code libraries so the endpoint still looked normal. It also carried code to steal a session cookie and replay it against the panel to reach other customers’ systems, though Huntress said those attempts had failed in recovered host logs reviewed so far.

For managed service providers and downstream customers, the useful work is concrete: inventory ScreenConnect extensions, find RMM+ deployments, check whether shared keys were ever set, and treat old project add-ons as privileged software. ConnectWise’s month already included a separate Cloud Backup supply-chain incident tied by Microsoft to Storm-0940. The pattern is bigger than one product name: remote-management trust keeps becoming a convenient attack path.


Published ·Deep Fathom

ScreenConnect RMM+ add-on lets attackers install rogue clients on 288 endpoints — The Broadside