supply-chainvendorNewsThe Broadside1 min read

Microsoft says SCKit targets ScreenConnect technician workstations

For MSPs, the uncomfortable part is that cleanup spans technician browsers, managed endpoints, and exposed sessions, not just one rogue client.


TL;DR

Microsoft says threat actors are abusing cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances used by managed service providers to install unauthorized remote-access clients and deploy SCKit on customer managed endpoints. The worm establishes persistence, deploys RelayTrap to deliver payloads to connecting technicians, and Microsoft says defenders should investigate technician workstations and downstream affected endpoints. Removing the unauthorized client alone doesn’t clear persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions.

Microsoft’s November 13 write-up makes the ScreenConnect campaign a technician-workstation problem, not just another unwanted remote monitoring and management client problem. ConnectWise reported the activity beginning November 11, with unauthorized access to cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances belonging to managed service providers. Microsoft says it confirmed that activity and observed threat actors using ScreenConnect to install unauthorized remote-access clients and deploy SCKit on customer managed endpoints.

The operational detail matters. Microsoft says deployment starts with commands issued through ScreenConnect to silently install a client tied to threat actor-controlled infrastructure. A batch launcher then retrieves a PowerShell decoder that decrypts and extracts SCKit using device-specific key material. The toolkit establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and registry Run entries, then deploys RelayTrap, which Microsoft describes as a component designed to deliver a malicious payload to a connecting technician.

That changes the investigation boundary for MSPs. ScreenConnect is built around a management instance, a technician workstation, and customer endpoints. Microsoft says the worm targets IT support technician workstations using a hijacked authenticated ScreenConnect session and uses the victim’s management console to distribute payloads to other managed devices. It also says access to either target can let threat actors remotely administer affected endpoints, execute commands, and deploy more tools outside the legitimate support instance.

So the practical instruction is broader than uninstalling a strange remote-access client. Microsoft says defenders should investigate technician workstations and downstream affected endpoints, and it warns that removing an unauthorized client alone doesn’t remove SCKit persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions. If your incident checklist stops at the customer endpoint, it’s missing the path Microsoft is telling you the actor is using.


Published ·Deep Fathom