House bill demands transparency in FCC equipment ban process
The Secure and Trusted Act gave the FCC a blacklist, the new bill wants to make its workings visible and constrain which adversaries trigger it.
TL;DR
House Energy and Commerce leaders introduced a bipartisan bill Sept. 23 that would impose new transparency and consistency requirements on the FCC's process for barring risky foreign equipment from U.S. networks. The Communications and Technology Transparency Act of 2026 would require the FCC to notify Congress at least seven days before adding or removing items from the Covered List. It also specifies that equipment from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is eligible for inclusion. The bill follows a series of FCC actions under Chairman Brendan Carr that added foreign-made drones, routers, and other device categories to the list, moves that drew industry pushback and requests for clarity.
The bill, introduced by Energy and Commerce Chairman Brett Guthrie (R-KY) and ranking member Frank Pallone (D-NJ), is a direct response to how the FCC's Covered List has been used in practice since the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act was signed in 2020. That law created the list and gave the FCC authority to bar equipment from companies deemed national-security threats. It also established a reimbursement fund for rural carriers ripping out Huawei and ZTE gear.
What the 2020 law didn't do was give the FCC a clear process for adding or removing entries, or a requirement to explain itself before acting. Under Carr, the list expanded quickly: foreign-made drones in December 2025, routers produced in foreign countries in March 2026, and "advanced robotic devices" and "connected power inverters" in June. Industry groups met with FCC staff repeatedly (in May, June, and August) seeking clarity on the scope and rationale of these bans.
The new bill tries to fill those procedural gaps. It requires seven days' congressional notice before any Covered List addition or removal. It specifies that equipment manufactured in China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran is eligible for inclusion, narrowing the sourcing lens to four named adversaries rather than leaving it open-ended. And it clarifies that listed entities and their affiliates are barred from receiving any FCC license, authorization, or grant of authority.
"The current process for identifying and barring malicious foreign technology has worked in many cases, but lacks the transparency, consistency, and clarity needed," Guthrie and Pallone said in their joint release. The sponsors appear to be signaling that the Covered List tool is worth keeping but needs guardrails, and that Congress, having learned from the rip-and-replace experience, wants a say before the list expands further.
Published ·Deep Fathom